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ABSTRACT
Background A range of evidence suggests that the dominant culture associated with the economic systems of ‘modern’societies has become a major
source of pressure on global resources and may precipitate a third revolution in human history, with major implications for health and well-being.
Objective This paper aims to consider whether there are historical analogies with contemporary circumstances which might help us make connections
between past and present predicaments in the human condition; to highlight the underpinnings of such predicaments in the politico-economic and
cultural systems found in ‘modern’societies; to outline questions prompted by this analysis, and stimulate greater debate around the issues raised.
Methods We draw on evidence and arguments condensed from complex research and theorizing from multiple disciplines.
Results Contemporary evidence suggests that global depletion of a key energy resource (oil), increasing environmental degradation and imminent
climate change can be linked to human socio-economic and cultural systems which are now out of balance with their environment. Those systems are
associated with Western-type societies, where political philosophies of neo-liberalism, together with cultural values of individualism, materialism and
consumerism, support an increasingly globalized capitalist economic system. Evidence points to a decline of psychological and social well-being in such
societies.
Conclusion We need to work out how to prevent/ameliorate the harms likely to ﬂow from climate change and rising oil costs. Public health
professionals face the challenge of preventing adverse health consequences likely to result from continued adherence to the have-it-all mindset
prevailing in contemporary Western societies. Equally, we need to seek out the potential health dividends that could be realized in terms of reduced
obesity, improved well-being and greater social equity, while not under-estimating the likelihood of profound resistance, from many sectors of society,
to unwanted but inevitable change.
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Introduction
This paper has a number of aims: ﬁrstly, to consider the
question of whether there are historical analogies with con-
temporary circumstances which might help us make connec-
tions between past and present predicaments in the human
condition; secondly, to highlight the underpinnings of these
predicaments in the politico-economic and cultural systems
found in ‘modern’ societies and thirdly, to outline some of
the questions prompted by this analysis, and to stimulate
greater debate around the issues raised. The arguments we
present have been condensed from complex research and
theorizing from multiple disciplines, in line with a disciplin-
ary tradition of drawing on knowledge from other ﬁelds. We
are, however, aware that there are some tensions between
evidence and speculation throughout the paper and have,
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The ﬁrst section refers to suggestive historical arguments
that populations outgrew key resources in the past, causing an
imbalance between human systems and their environment.
The point is that adaptive responses were accompanied
by substantial changes, not just in terms of technological
innovation, but also to social and economic structures, beliefs
and value systems, and population health and well-being.
There may be parallels here with contemporary conditions. In
the second and third sections of the paper, we outline think-
ing from multiple disciplines which point to the close relation-
ship between contemporary politico-economic systems, social
structures and cultural values; this relationship impacts on
individual, social and global levels of well-being. The ﬁnal sec-
tions raise a number of questions for public health, identify
some signiﬁcant challenges, and call for greater debate on the
issues raised.
A historical perspective
Developments in human progress which led to the ‘modern’
world include the agricultural revolutions (both the early
shift from hunter-gatherer to agrarian societies, and its later
manifestation in seventeenth–eighteenth-century Europe),
and the major industrial revolution which followed this.
From one perspective, these revolutions were positive
developments which made greater resources available to
more people and, thus, spurred population growth. From
another, population growth itself drove such developments,
as resources for any particular way of life became depleted.
From either perspective, some key environmental changes
have arguably been of humanity’s own making, prompted by
insufﬁcient resources to supply a population’s way of life at
any one time. These remain contentious areas of debate for
historians, with accounts perhaps owing something to shift-
ing ideologies about human development and progress as
much as ‘facts’.
According to some, three major factors—population growth,
technological development and increasing consumption—lie
behind our increasingly damaging impact on the planet.
1 An
alternative perspective suggests that it is neither technology
nor consumption per se which is at fault, but the adoption of
a particular form of economic system that uses ever-
increasing consumption as its basis for growth, thus leading
to high levels of resource depletion which are incompatible
with a large and growing population. From this more
nuanced perspective, human history is the story of increasing
numbers of people, the development of increasingly invasive
and disruptive forms of technology by some societies and
increasing levels of consumption by those societies. The
economic and cultural practices of some societies are, we
suggest, the fourth compounding feature underpinning
present problems.
We know that modes of human social organization and
associated cultural beliefs and value systems changed, in par-
allel with the two revolutions, with both beneﬁcial and
harmful outcomes for population health. Social classes
emerged from the earliest agricultural revolution, as did
warfare and slavery. Fossil and other forms of evidence
suggest that physical health declined. We know that culture
also changed, with the development of ideologies which—
ultimately—legitimated the domination of all men over nature,
some men over other men and most men over women.
Individual and social well-being may have declined, as evidence
from contemporary hunter–gatherer societies suggests that
their levels of well-being and happiness are higher than that of
people living in more ‘developed’societies.
2
The health and social costs of the Western industrial revo-
lution, in terms of urban overcrowding, unsanitary living
conditions and associated rise in infectious diseases,
accompanied by appalling poverty and misery for many
people, are too well known to need rehearsing. These devel-
opments were later accompanied by environmental problems
such as land degradation, vast amounts of chemical fertiliza-
tion, water pollution and phenomena such as acid rain, red
tides and global warming. Cultural and ideological change is
also associated with the early part of this period—and was
legitimated by Enlightenment thinking—in that the natural
world came to be viewed as a material resource to be pil-
laged and a challenge to be overcome by humankind’s
apparently limitless technical ingenuity, in the name of pro-
gress. The development of a capital-based economic system
was a key factor in driving widespread social change, as
large numbers of people were required to serve the mechan-
ized factory system.
3 Other longer-term cultural legacies and
consequences are explored below.
A crisis of ‘modern culture’?
A key point is that humans adapt through cultural, rather
than genetic, evolution: we have learned how to manipulate
our environments through the use of multiple forms of
technology, mechanized and otherwise. Our successes
have kept us at the top of the food chain and helped foster
the concept of humankind as the endpoint of evolution
4—a
notion which resonates with the traditions of
Judaeo-Christian theology in Western society. This in turn
has led many in the ‘developed’ world to believe that
humankind can escape the controls of nature; contemporary
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sion.
5 It is undeniable that modern, Western-type societies
have seen an unprecedented growth in wealth and material
comfort over recent decades and many causes of suffering
that afﬂicted people in past centuries, such as absolute
forms of poverty and certain diseases, have now been elimi-
nated or reduced.
6 Most of us live longer lives than in
earlier (industrial) times, and few would choose to return to
hunter–gatherer lifestyles. Nevertheless, there is also good
evidence that average levels of individual well-being
(whether conceived as subjective happiness or life satisfac-
tion) within such societies appear not to have increased.
Research suggests that the main sources of well-being in
‘advanced’ economies are friendships and a good family life,
and that once one is beyond the poverty level, a larger
income contributes little.
7–11 Moreover, family solidarity and
community integration appear to have been eroded over
recent decades, while individuals become more distrustful of
each other and their political institutions. We therefore have
an apparent paradox whereby economic growth within
market democracies is accompanied by a gradual rise in
various forms of individual and social disorders, evidenced
by increased rates of depression and other forms of mental
illness,
12,13 high rates of suicide in some areas,
14 increasing
levels of inter-personal violence,
15 a range of addictive beha-
viours (such as alcoholism, illegal drug use, obesity and
gambling),
16 family breakdown, degradation of the social
fabric and widening health and social inequalities.
17,18 These
complex and coincidental trends are not, of course, proof of
a causal relationship but are at least suggestive of connec-
tions between a speciﬁc politico-economic system
12 and
psycho-socio-cultural problems.
More speculative ﬁndings from evolutionary psychology
6
and neuroscience
19 suggest that neural structures and chem-
istry render the human species particularly vulnerable to
damaging social comparisons; humans are believed to be
subject to evolutionary drives towards rivalry and compe-
tition, which motivates individuals to pursue positional
goods (i.e. social status, wealth and material possessions).
This positional psychology, thus, explains the individual’s
urge to stay on the ‘hedonic treadmill’, practising the relent-
less accumulation of material things in the belief that this
will make him or her happy—even though this is an
irrational, zero sum game when many others in the same
society are in similar social positions, all struggling for the
same coveted forms of status or possessions. Moreover,
psychological evidence tells us that humans quickly adapt to
changes in status, meaning that we are never satisﬁed for
long with what we achieve and acquire. We are also pro-
foundly averse to losses.
Recent public health research suggests that the well-being
across ‘modern’ societies is being damaged by particular
aspects of contemporary culture. These aspects are econo-
mism, materialism, consumerism and individualism.
20
Economism is the tendency to view the world through
the lens of economics, to regard a nation as an economy
rather than a society and to believe that economic consider-
ations and values are the most important ones while other
values get squeezed out. Materialism and consumerism
derive from the belief that meaning, happiness and fulﬁl-
ment are to be acquired through the possession of material
things. In the modern consumer society, material values
rank higher than spiritual values, and the relationships of
the marketplace dominate. Individualism means that, while
many of us are freer of some of the constraints of earlier
societies, we are also viewed as responsible for success in
life, and are blamed for any failures. Individualisation means
that people are subject to reduced social support and social
control, in a context of increased individual expectations, all
of which result in a sense of increased insecurity, anxiety
and stress.
3
Conﬁrmation of this diagnosis can be found in social and
political science literature which focuses on the ways in
which socio-economic structures and cultural systems shape
views of the good life in ‘modern’ societies. The neo-liberal
politico-economic systems of such societies are ostensibly
based on the utilitarian philosophy of happiness (i.e. the
greatest good for the greatest number) but, according to
some, these systems have contributed to our dissatisfaction
with life.
21 While consumption is a normal part of all
human societies, the consumerism found in ‘modern’ econ-
omies involves the relentless commodiﬁcation of many
aspects of life and human relationships.
3,22 Moreover, the
search for well-being, status and identity in wealthy societies
through consumer goods is an unending quest, fed by multi-
billion dollar advertising and media industries, but doomed
to the perpetual disappointment upon which our economic
system actually depends for its survival.
23–26 Put bluntly,
consumption rarely fulﬁls the promise of happiness it holds
out—but we apparently never tire of its pursuit.
At the global level (the natural environment on which we
all depend), the apparently unstoppable rise in over-
consumption by comparatively small numbers of people
may ultimately render the physical world uninhabitable for
humankind and other species.
28 At the same time, vast
numbers still need to escape absolute levels of poverty, so
continued economic growth is a necessity for many
nations
29 although some reduction in population growth will
also be required. One conclusion from the ﬁndings
rehearsed above is that the dominant cultural norms and
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Western societies, have resulted in a marked imbalance
between our way of life and the environmental carrying
capacity of the planet on which all humanity depends.
Humanity faces looming global changes as at least a partial
consequence
30: these include climate change,
31 which may
precipitate socio-economic impacts such as mass migration.
We may well have passed the peak in oil production
32,33; the
loss of an energy resource on which most Western societies
depend will lead to dramatic social changes,
34 possibly even
oil wars (some would say that we are already in this
position).
Yet despite much rhetoric, tokenistic change seems the
predominant response from wealthy nations to emerging
crises. Action on recycling waste products in high income
nations, for example, takes place side by side with virtually
unchanged consumption patterns; many apparently
espouse ‘green’ discourses while still seeking to ‘have it
all’, in the form of overseas holidays, car ownership and
the latest consumer gadgets.
35 ‘Downshifting’ may be
on the increase but it remains far from the norm.
36 In
short, the cumulative consequences of modern consumer-
ism have resulted in unsustainable lifestyles for high-
income countries, while low-income countries suffer a
continued disadvantage.
37
The implications for Public Health: new
challenges, emergent responses
A number of important questions are raised by the analysis
presented above. If human behaviour is shaped and driven
by evolutionary factors which predispose us towards (over)-
consumption, how are these to be overcome? If all societies
will ultimately need to move away from wealth- and status-
based economic growth, and from consumerism, how can
this be achieved? How can we deal with the consequences
of a foreseeable collapse in the current economic system?
What, for example, are the implications for employment—
given that most people are now employed in consumption
or service industries, rather than in production or manufac-
turing industries? And what might be the likely responses of
people, industry and government? If we are currently experi-
encing a change of age, as argued in this paper, what are the
implications for public health?
The history of public health contains examples of prac-
titioners who acted to protect public health in ways that
would not be tolerated in today’s more liberal society. There
has been a long disciplinary tradition of championing econ-
omic and social change where there is a clear impact on the
health of the population, which can be traced from the
nineteenth century demands for urban sanitation made by
Edwin Chadwick.
38 Today, public health leaders and prac-
titioners operate in a world shaped by modern social and
political philosophies which value individual choice, rights
and freedoms. These values inform their work, meaning
that public health may try to apply a model derived from
voluntary behaviour change to phenomena like climate
change. Yet public health has always remained capable of
radical responses to emergent problems, from work in the
1980s on the potential impact of the use of nuclear
weapons
39 to recent studies of excess mortality associated
with the latest Iraq war.
40 Although the public health task—
that of preventing disease and promoting health—remains
unchanged, the form which public health challenges take will
change because this is, in some respects, unique to each age
and therefore requires speciﬁc responses.
The ﬁrst challenge is to recognize that the components of
effective adaptation to the future will be unpredictable and
emergent rather than predictable and planned. At the begin-
ning of the industrial revolution, infectious diseases were
dominant but alcohol consumption, crime and illegitimate
births (to quote just three indices) were also substantially
higher in most UK and American cities than they are
today.
41 If we were able to go back in time and visit one of
the original medical ofﬁcers of health in a great industrial
UK city, he would probably not be able to set out his plans
for health improvement in detail. Instead, he might explain
the approach he was adopting and the types of interventions
that would probably be needed, in the face of emergent pro-
blems. He would obviously not be aware that what would
emerge over time would be a public health focus on clean
water, sanitation and legislation, nor would he be able to
foresee the importance of co-operative societies, modern
police forces, health visitors, universal education, orphanages
and much else, which were supported by grass-root efforts
to create and sustain a whole series of informal norms and
behaviours that were, in their time, important for social
order.
We are surely in an analogous position. If we are to be as
successful as those early champions of public health, then
we will need to seek similarly emergent solutions, recogniz-
ing that these will be no easier for us to predict than the
panoply of solutions eventually devised in response to the
industrial revolution. How the future unfolds for public
health will be determined by the mindset adopted; this pro-
vides our second challenge. The current mindset of many is
still, apparently, denial; once denial comes to an end, it can
be followed by tokenistic action. Others may express an
optimistic faith in the ability of science and technology to
solve problems associated with rising energy costs and
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deal with obesity, declining well-being and rising inequalities.
Others might be less optimistic but still look to technical
solutions: these may involve the use of power to ensure the
continued health of the industrialized nations by maintaining
their current economies and lifestyles.
We suggest that new circumstances will require a new
ideology: one that emphasizes the rights of all global citizens
while seeking a sustainable solution to current and future
ecological challenges. Those who wish to embrace this will
need to accept that, while new social and technical solutions
will be vital, our way of life will change radically as we move
towards a 90% cut in CO2 emissions and independence
from fossil fuels. Although economic growth, as traditionally
measured, is likely to suffer, we could see a reprioritization
of society towards values which promote well-being, health
and equity, while reducing inequalities and over-
consumption.
The balance of public health methods will also have to
change—our third challenge—although ‘the basics’ will
remain the same (i.e. deﬁne the problem, gather intelligence,
analyse and formulate solutions that are disseminated,
implemented and evaluated). At present we are ‘prisoners of
the proximate’,
42 in the sense that we prioritize epidemiolo-
gical studies of relatively proximate causes of disease, at the
expense of a synthesis from a wide spectrum of ﬁelds which
might help us grasp the sheer breadth of the emerging
challenge. New methods to be considered include analysis
of ‘futures’, scenario planning,
42 eco-epidemiology
43 and a
radical synthesis of knowledge from such disparate disci-
plines as philosophy, ethics, cultural studies, politics and
economics, with the more familiar public health sciences.
A key task for public health will then be to capture the ideas
of innovators and ‘positive deviants’,
44 and enhance them
through an iterative cycle of learning, implementation and
improvement.
An example of a tool that can facilitate new thinking is
the ‘three horizons’ framework
45 (see Fig. 1).
In Horizon 1 we may see a system under strain, beginning
to show signs of failing or facing challenges of sustainability.
In Horizon 3 we see the eventual evolution of a more sus-
tainable system, adapted to new conditions (having taken
several decades to reach this stage). In Horizon 2, however,
we see the struggle between these two: the old system
declining in importance and the new struggling to be born.
Essentially, Horizon 2 is a period of transition from one
form of infrastructure to another. Each horizon is also
associated with a particular mindset. In the ﬁrst horizon the
priority is to shore up the existing system; this mindset is
likely to regard third horizon proponents as irrelevant but
will seek to capture successful second horizon innovations
in order to perpetuate their own (failing) system, often in
the guise of ‘scaling up’ successful experiments. The
mindset of the second horizon is that of dissatisfaction with
Horizon 1, believing it to be ultimately unsustainable; it
regards the third horizon as inspirational and so its future
priority is to shift policy and practice towards the new
model. It may be that we are approaching Horizon 2 at
present. The third horizon is visionary, seeing the ﬁrst as
misguided and the second as promising. Its priority is to
sow the seeds of a radically new future, usually ‘under the
radar’ of the ﬁrst.
Although all three of these perspectives exist and have
their advocates and their bodies of evidence in the present,
our existing policy processes are fairly inﬂexible when it
comes to working with such multiple viewpoints. Yet, a
policy option that has little to recommend it in the ﬁrst
horizon may have a large part to play in a possible third
horizon, and is therefore worth investing in, as a second
horizon innovation. The point is that the use of ‘horizons’
thinking enables formal recognition of at least three differ-
ent world views and three simultaneous views of the
present; such recognition might make for a ‘smarter’ policy
debate and better long-term decision-making.
Conclusions?
The great revolutions in human history (agricultural and
industrial) might have been prompted by growth in human
numbers and consequent resource pressures, though there is
comparatively little certainty about this. Nevertheless, popu-
lation growth, resource pressures and chronic over-
consumption by some societies are undeniable features of the
contemporary world. We may, then, face a different form of
revolution – one which will see dramatic change in the estab-
lished material comforts of wealthy societies, with knock-on Fig. 1 The three horizons model.
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paratively short-term economic success (but longer-term
failure of sustainability). As the International Panel on
Climate Change points out, the world needs to move towards
‘contraction and convergence’; i.e. wealthy nations must
reduce their carbon use in order to achieve sustainability, and
all nations need to converge on a more equitable level of con-
sumption, whether they want to or not.
There may be cause for (cautious) optimism. Many of the
most revolutionary steps in the evolution of life and human
society seem to have come about as the result of environ-
mental or other crises, but humans are not passive in the face
of such problems. They adapt, for example, by changing tech-
nology levels, fertility levels and consumption patterns, and
they change ways of managing the environment. A crisis can
be creative by providing an opening to an alternative future
created from the ruins of older systems. However, adaptation
does not appear to have been a matter of human choice but
rather of response to an emergency. Given that evidence
suggests human well-being declined for substantial periods
following profound historical change, we may reasonably
expect similar outcomes in future. This is particularly the case
given the high value placed on individual choices, autonomies
and freedoms by modern (Western-type) societies which do
not respond well to constraint. In those (non-Western) cul-
tures which privilege social inter-dependence over individual
independence, the transition may be easier; such societies
may well lead the way for the rest of us.
Although much has inevitably been omitted or over-
simpliﬁed through our cross-disciplinary/synthetic approach,
we believe it useful in bringing together knowledge about
the harmful impacts of ‘modern’ culture with evidence from
earlier periods of human history which display warning par-
allels. Because the human population is now much larger,
and certain socio-economic and cultural systems more inten-
sive in their inﬂuence and extensive in their global reach, the
impact on health and well-being of the trends we discuss is
likely to be far greater. If there is a role for public health
professionals in facing new, twenty-ﬁrst century challenges,
then it will probably stem from the desire to prevent the
adverse health consequences likely to result from continued
adherence to the have-it-all, cornucopian mindset prevailing
in contemporary Western societies. We need to work out
how to prevent (or at least ameliorate) the harms likely to
ﬂow from climate change and rising oil costs. Equally, we
need to seek out the potential health dividends that could
be realized in terms of reduced obesity, improved well-being
and greater social equity, while not under-estimating the like-
lihood of profound resistance, from many sectors of society,
to unwanted but inevitable change.
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